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Annual Brainerd Currie Lecture
How Modern Choice of Law
Helped to Kill the Private
Attorney General
by Erin O'Hara O'Connor*
The law of unintended consequencespushes us ceaselessly through the
years, permitting no pause for perspective.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is a great honor to be asked to deliver the second Annual Brainerd
Currie Lecture at Mercer University School of Law? Brainerd Currie
was an immensely influential law professor who is recognized as the
leading scholar of conflict of laws in the twentieth century. Mercer has
the distinction of being both Currie's law school alma mater as well as
his first academic appointment, probably the two most significant
intellectual influences on any scholar. More recently, Mercer has

* Milton R. Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. University of
Rochester (B.A., cum laude, 1987); Georgetown University Law Center (J.D., magna cum
laude, 1990). Special thanks to the faculty, students, and Dean of Mercer Law School for
providing a very fruitful environment in which to address the topic of this Essay. I
benefited from all of their many comments and suggestions. Thank you also to Beau
Creson for valuable research assistance.
1. Richard Schickel, author, journalist, and documentary filmmaker. Richard Schnickel
Quoted, Thinkexist.com, http:J/thinkexist.com/quotation/the law_of_unintended-conse
quences.pushes-us/224966.html (last visited May 10, 2013).
2. For the first lecture given in the Annual Brainerd Currie Lecture series, see Gary
J. Simson, Choice of Law After the Currie Revolution: What Role for the Needs of the
Interstateand InternationalSystems?, 63 MERCER L. REV. 715 (2012).
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attracted other influential conflicts scholars and cheerleaders of the
topic, including Dean Gary Simson, Larry Ribstein, Hal Lewis, and
Bruce Posnak, among others. Thus, Mercer is a most fitting host for
such an occasion.
The lecture provides an occasion to celebrate the highly influential
work of Brainerd Currie in the area of conflict of laws. Currie formulated an entirely new approach to choice of law that has revolutionized the
way courts and scholars think about the problem. With fifty years of
hindsight, however, it is possible to look back on the influence of Currie's
work with quite a bit more perspective than might have been possible
earlier. With that perspective, I hope to argue that Currie's approach
has had unintended and, for Currie, perverse consequences. Without
thinking carefully about the long-term consequences of their choice-oflaw decisions or how the choice-of-law landscape would play a role in the
ever-increasing pressures presented by interstate and international
trade, courts using modern approaches to choice of law have contributed
to the demise of the private attorney general. In doing so, the choice-oflaw revolution, which Currie sparked in order to enable states to more
effectively promote state policies, ultimately has produced the opposite
result.
This Essay will briefly explain Currie's approach to choice of law and
its significant influence for modern choice-of-law approaches. It will
then explain how one of those approaches, the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws,3 both facilitated further state experimentation with
choice-of-law policies and enabled private parties to gain some certainty
regarding the governing law for contracts. This Essay will show how the
choice-of-law clauses sanctioned in the Second Restatement work in
tandem with other choice clauses to enable private parties to avoid
undesired laws. Finally, this Essay will argue that the choice clauses
have led to the demise of the private attorney general.
II.

BRAINERD CURRIE, MERCER UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, AND
CHOICE OF LAW

Brainerd Currie's best known intellectual contribution was offered a
half century ago, when he proposed a revolutionary approach to choice
of law. 4 Choice of law addresses the question of what law governs a
legal dispute involving people, things, or events that span two or more

3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) [hereinafter SECOND RESTATEMENT].
4. See Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959
DUKE L.J. 171 (1959), reprintedin SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 177 (1963).
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jurisdictions (namely states or nations) where each jurisdiction can
legitimately claim sovereign authority over the dispute. The problem of
how to allocate sovereign authority in these inter-jurisdictional disputes
has challenged courts throughout recorded legal history.'
Currie's proposed approach, known as interest analysis, was welltimed. American conflicts scholars and judges had become frustrated
with the Restatement (First)of Conflict of Laws6 formalistic, rules-based
approach to choice of law. 7 At root, the First Restatement shared the

virtues and vices of formalism. On the one hand, the rules were
designed to be simple and clear, and therefore (at least in theory),
capable of being uniformly applied across United States courts. As part
of that simplicity, the applicable law was typically determined according
to a single connecting factor, such as the location of property,' an
injury,9 or the making of a contract." On the other hand, the simple
rules often seemed arbitrary because they failed to produce sensible
results in a world where real people became embroiled in locationally
complicated relationships." Moreover, the rules sometimes failed to

5.

See EUGENE F. SCOLES, PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONI-

2.2-2.6 (3d ed. 2000).
6. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) [hereinafter FIRST RESTATE-

DES, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§

MENT].
7. There are multiple critiques of the First Restatement. Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co.,
342 F.2d 617, 618-20 (7th Cir. 1965) (discussing inadequacy of place of the wrong approach
and citing multiple cases with similar criticisms); Kilberg v. Ne. Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d
526, 527-28 (N.Y. 1961) (criticizing the idea of deciding applicable law in case where
wrongful death was caused by plane crash based on fortuity of the place of wrong); Griffith
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796, 801 (Pa. 1964) (agreeing with criticism of the First
Restatement's "wooden application"); WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL
BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 344 (1942); see Walter Wheeler Cook, 'Characterization'
in the Conflict of Laws, 51 YALE L.J. 191 (1941); Albert A Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in
the Conflict of Laws-Towards a Theory of Enterprise Liability Under "Foreseeableand
InsurableLaws": 1, 69 YALE L.J. 595 (1960); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in
IntentionalMultistate Torts: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 36 MINN. L. REV. 1
(1951); Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality,Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE
L.J. 736 (1924); J. H. C. Morris, The ProperLaw of a Tort, 64 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1951).
8. See, e.g., FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, §§ 211, 214, 216-23, 225-27, 237-38,
244-46, 248-51 (designating the law of the state where land is located as the governing law
for various matters related to interests in real property).
9. See, e.g., id. § 377 (defining place of wrong to be the place of injury in most tort
contexts); id. §§ 378, 384-87, 390-91, 412, 421 (designating the law of the place of wrong
as the governing law for a number of tort issues).
10. See, e.g., id. § 332 (stating various contract issues that are to be resolved according
to the law of the place of contracting).
11. See, e.g., Alabama G.S.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 804, 809 (Ala. 1892) (applying
Mississippi law to case involving two Alabama parties and an employment contract formed
in Alabama where fellow employees failed to perform an inspection in Alabama but the
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produce clear results, effectively undermining the uniformity or
predictability that justify a rules-based treatment of choice of law.
Although judges often found the rules unsatisfactory, as a group they
generally lacked the time and inclination to figure out a sensible
alternative approach. 2 After all, choice of law is, or at least should be,
a preliminary procedural question to be decided in pretrial hearings. To
most people, even most lawyers, the choice-of-law question seems
Indeed, even though choice of law
technical and uninteresting.
functionally allocates sovereign authority, in most states the general
question has not even attracted the attention of the legislature. Most
academics view the choice-of-law question as similarly dull and
unworthy of sustained attention. Mercer is a distinct exception in that
it has a history of attracting scholars who are drawn to the topic and
understand its importance. In most other corners of the country,
however, choice of law is plagued by what I will call "the Snooze Factor."
Currie offered a dramatically different conception of how courts should
treat choice-of-law issues. Rather than blindly following arbitrary rules,
Currie thought that courts should use choice-of-law principles designed
to effectuate state policies. 3 After all, given that state laws are tools
designed to further state policies, exercising sovereign authority can be
justified only when doing so serves to further those policies. Differing
state laws typically reflect differing policy priorities, and Currie
advocated that a court should first determine the policy that each state
is attempting to further and then determine whether, given the
locational facts of a case, the policies of each state are in fact implicated.

injury happened to occur in Mississippi); Linn v. Emp'rs Reinsurance Corp., 139 A.2d 638,
639-40 (Pa. 1958) (holding that the law of the state where a phone call was made would
determine applicable law even though the call may have been placed in any number of
states while the agent was travelling for unrelated matters).
12. Judge Fuld on the New York Court of Appeals was an exception to this general
observation. He devoted substantial energy to identifying and then articulating an
alternative approach to choice of law through a series of case opinions. See, e.g., Auten v.
Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (N.Y. 1954) (rejecting "rigid general rules" in a divorce
agreement case for a "grouping of contacts" theory that chose the law of the state that was
more interested); Haag v. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441, 444 (N.Y. 1961) (using significant
contacts test for contract dispute for child support); Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279,
284-85 (N.Y. 1963) (applying significant contacts test in a tort dispute involving a guest
statute); Downs v. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 200 N.E.2d 204, 206 (N.Y. 1964) (using
significant contacts test for case involving woman's collection of wages from ex-husband);
Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 204 N.E.2d 622, 625-26 (N.Y. 1965) (using significant contacts
test to determine foreign law allowing direct suit was applicable).
13. See Brainerd Currie &Herma Hill Schreter, UnconstitutionalDiscrimination
in the

Conflict of Laws: Privilegesand Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 1323, 1323-24 (1960) (discussing
an alternative approach based on purposes behind state law).
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If a state's policies are not implicated (for example, if state X attempts
to ensure that its injured citizens are compensated, but the plaintiff is
not from state X), then that state's law need not apply to resolve the
dispute. To Currie, the choice-of-law inquiry could be simplified by
eliminating disinterested states from the consideration. 4 When a
state's policies are implicated, then its policies can be furthered through
application of that state's law.
As a general conceptual matter, Currie's approach appealed to many.
Judges began to experiment with the approach. 5 Scholars applauded
the innovation and offered their own refinements and tweaks for dealing
with difficult fact patterns. 6 In particular, William Baxter and other
scholars offered alternative solutions to the situation where more than
one connected
state could claim a legitimate interest in having its law
17
apply.

14. Brainerd Currie, MarriedWomen's Contracts:A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method,
25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227, 252-54 (1958) (using the phrase "false-problem" initially).
15. See, e.g., In re Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport on Aug. 16, 1987, 750 F. Supp.
793, 802 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (using interest analysis to determine applicable law between
interested states); Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 729 (Cal. 1967) (applying interest
analysis rather than mechanical conflicts of laws and citing Currie); Mellk v. Sarahson, 229
A.2d 625, 629 (N.J. 1967) (citing Currie when refusing to apply traditional conflicts rules
and instead applying the law of the interested state); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Fries, 355 N.Y.S.2d
741, 747 (Civ. Ct. 1974) (noting that neither state was interested and reasoning that under
Currie's interest analysis the law of the forum would apply, but finding that New York law
applied regardless); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 133 N.W.2d 408, 412-13 (Wis. 1965) (citing Currie
and others as critical of the traditional approach and applying interest analysis to decide
applicable law).
16. See, e.g., Hans W. Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for Progress?Reflections
on Reading Cavers, the Choice-of-Law Process, 46 TEX. L. REV. 141 (1967); William F.
Baxter, Choice ofLaw and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1, 8 (1963) (agreeing with
some of Currie's basic ideas, including the rules on false conflicts); Bruce Alan Rosenfield,
ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 28 STAN.
L. REV. 1005, 1038 (1976) (citing Currie's interest analysis as a good approach that could
be used in extraterritorial application of law cases); Michael Traynor, Conflict of Laws:
Professor Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum, 49 CAL. L. REV. 845, 845 (1961).
17. See Baxter, supra note 16, at 33 (proposing the comparative impairment approach
for true conflicts); John F. Bradley H, Note, After Hurtado and Bernhar&" InterestAnalysis
and the Search for a Consistent Theory for Choice-of-Law Cases, 29 STAN. L. REV. 127, 151
(1976) (arguing that in the case of true conflicts, the court should avoid the bias in choosing
the forum law and try to reach a "just"result); Susan P. Windle, Choice of Law Governing
Land Transactions: The Contract-ConveyanceDichotomy, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 482 (1963)
(offering various ways to deal with true conflicts for real property situations); Note, DirectAction Statutes: Their Operationaland Conflict-of-Law Problems, 74 HARV. L. REV. 357,
387 (1960) [hereinafter Direct-Action Statutes] (offering that certainty should also play a
role in the case of true conflicts); Note, The Choice of Law in Multistate Defamation-A
FunctionalApproach, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1463, 1471 (1964) (arguing that in the case of true
conflicts, a functional approach should be employed).
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Currie's interest analysis was not universally embraced, however. For
example, some scholars charged that Currie's definition of state interests
was too parochial because he assumed that states had an interest only
in protecting or otherwise aiding their own citizens.'" Others expressed
concern over Currie's singular focus on state interests; they argued
forcefully that advancing state interests was just one of several purposes
to be furthered with choice of law.'9 Several scholars offered alternative proposals for choice of law, some of which were the source of court
experiment.2 0
For one who believes that optimal public policy is furthered with a
robust intellectual marketplace of ideas, choice of law enjoyed a happy
state during the course of the last half century. In this ideal state, the
generation of and experimentation with diverse solutions should produce
an environment where one proposal stands out as superior to others.2
At a minimum, one would hope that experimentation with choice of law
would generate consensus regarding the basic approach even though
states might adopt variation regarding specific problems, reflecting the
difficulty of satisfactorily resolving some choice-of-law problems. Our
federal system might have proven specially adapted to help achieve
optimal choice-of-law reform, whether the goal of choice of law was
efficiency, fairness, or something else. But, alas, this utopian fairy tale
does not reflect the realities of choice of law in our federal system.
Choice of law in the United States has been chaotic since Currie
offered his proposed treatment of the topic. A large majority of states

18. See Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH.
L. REV. 392, 392-93 (1980); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolutionin Conflicts Law?
From Beale to Cavers, 80 HAmV. L. REV. 377, 388-90 (1966); John Hart Ely, Choice of Law

and the State'sInterest in ProtectingIts Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173, 175-76 (1981);
see also EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICTS IN A NUTSHELL (3d ed. 1974) ("[Glovernments are,
outside the law of admirality, 'interested' in the solution of conflicts problems only in such
exceptional cases as tax or currency matters.").
19. See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 18, at 393-95; Maurice Rosenberg, The Comeback
of Choice-of-Law Rules, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 946, 947 (1981); Note, Direct-Action Statutes,

supra note 17, at 378.
20. California has adopted Baxter's comparative impairment approach.

See, e.g.,

Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914, 937 (Cal. 2006). Five other states
have adopted the "Better-Law" Methodology, a factor in Leflar's choice-influencing
considerations approach.

See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American

Courts in 2011: Twenty-Fifth Annual Survey, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 291, 309, 317,342 (2012).
21. That is true unless the environments across states differ in ways suggesting that
diverse solutions to a problem are warranted. In this context, however, the states are
experimenting with solutions to the problem of how to coordinate the allocation of
sovereign authority across the states. Presumably optimal coordination needs a single
approach.
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(although not all) have abandoned the First Restatement and replaced
it with one or more distinct approaches to choice of law. Many have
adopted Currie's interest analysis. Others have moved toward a
"comparative impairment," "better law," forum law, or European-style
statutory approach to choice of law." Although these other approaches
to choice of law are distinct, embedded in many of them is a type of
interest analysis. The chaos in choice of law does not merely result from
states having adopted differing approaches to choice of law. Even within
individual states it is commonly impossible to predict what law will be
applied in an interstate case. In some states, the actual approach
adopted has remained somewhat uncertain. The movement away from
the First Restatement was typically announced through state court
decision, but choice of law is a technical, procedural issue that rarely sits
at the forefront of a state supreme court's agenda (the Snooze Factor),
and as a result, the clarification and refinement of a state's approach
often proceeds quite slowly. Even when it is clear which approach a
state has adopted, the resolution to any given choice-of-law issue can
remain unpredictable. Under the modern approaches to choice of law,
relatively vague standards effectively grant trial court judges significant
discretion.2 3
III.

THE SECOND RESTATEMENT EMPOWERS CONTRACTING PARTIES TO
RESTORE CERTAINTY

In 1954, the American Law Institute formed a working group to
produce the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws. The project proved
especially challenging, as disenchantment with the First Restatement
had not yet worked to produce an alternative approach in state courts.
Although some drafters were comfortable articulating a new approach
for courts to adopt, the draft produced exhibits a schitzophrenic position
over basic matters, such as whether choice-of-law issues should be
resolved with rules or with standards. The text of the Second Restatement was not published until 1971 and contained a very complicated
approach that relied on both default rules and a universally applied
multi-factored standard focused on determining the state with the most
"significant relationship" to the parties and the relevant occurrence.2 4
As part of the multi-factored standard, courts are encouraged to consider
just about everything a court or commentator had thought was
22. See generally LEA BRILMAYER, JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIN Ol-ARA O'CONNOR,
CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 3 (6th ed. 2011).

23. Michael Ena, Comment, Choice of Law and Predictabilityof Decisionsin Products
Liability Cases, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1417, 1456 (2007).
24. Id. at 1428-30.
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important to a choice-of-law decision, including a determination of how
choice of law might further state policies.25 The Second Restatement
certainly represents a comprehensive approach to choice of law, but it
reflects a grand political compromise rather than offering a coherent
mechanism for moving forward with choice of law.
Given the state of choice of law in 1971, the grand political compromise might well have seemed the best possible solution to the drafters'
dilemma. If one agrees with Justice Brandeis that states serve as
valuable laboratories of experimentation, 6 then the Second Restatement preserved maximal flexibility for the states to continue to work
with the several credible approaches to choice of law that had been
proffered.
It now seems clear, however, that choice of law has proven to be a poor
place for the drafters to have counted on productive state experimentation. Relying on the states themselves to sort out choice of law was a
mistake for multiple reasons, including the Snooze Factor." Typically,
no entity within a state cares to treat the matter systemically.
Legislatures tend not to focus on technical pretrial litigation procedure,
and in the rare circumstances when they do, their attentions quickly
return to matters of salience. It now seems clear, however, that apellate
judges are more likely to have an interest in the question, but even their
attention spans seem to be short in the face of competing matters. Trial
court judges must routinely contend with choice-of-law issues, but they
are not in a position to treat the problem systemically. In general, state
trial court judges are too mired in the trees to focus on the forest.

25.

Under § 6, factors relevant to the choice of law include: (a) the needs of the
interstate and international systems; (b) the relevant polices of the forum; (c) the
relevant polices of other interested states and the relative interests of those states
in the determination of the particular issue; (d) the protection of justified
expectations; (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law; (f)
certainty, predictability and uniformity of result; and (g) ease in the determination
and application of the law to be applied.
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 6(2).
26. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments

without risk to the rest of the country.").
27. Another problem is that the states themselves are asked to allocate state sovereign
authority, leading inevitably to non-neutral decisions. Currie understood this difficulty but
created an approach to choice of law that accepted political realities. See ScoLES ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 29-30. Baxter also understood the difficulty, but rather than accepting it
as inevitable, he proposed returning authority to the federal courts to develop sensible
guidelines for such allocation. See Baxter, supra note 16, at 33.
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This Essay will not dwell on the problems of modern choice of law in
the United States, however. Large volumes of ink have already been
spilt bemoaning our predicament, with little good resulting from the
effort. Instead, this predicament sets the stage for understanding how
the choice-of-law problem in the United States led to the creation of
§ 187 of the Second Restatement, which provided a new approach to the
treatment of choice-of-law clauses by U.S. courts. Section 187 unintentionally planted the seeds of a movement by private parties to use choice
of law to circumvent undesired state laws. In doing so, the private
attorney general has been dealt a mortal blow. Ironically, Currie's
efforts to help further state policies have led to a chain of events that
threaten to undermine those very policies.
In furtherance of establishing this thesis, let us return to the Second
Restatement. The drafters contemplated the same "most significant
relationship" approach for contracts problems that was to be applied to
other choice-of-law problems.28 Uncertainty regarding the governing
law could prove particularly problematic for contracting parties,
however, because being able to rely on a promise is part of the value for
contracts, and yet, reliance can be undermined with uncertainty
regarding an agreement's enforceability. To alleviate this uncertainty
concern, the drafters began with § 187, which enables contracting parties
to choose their own governing law. 29 Section 187 is a significant
departure from the First Restatement, which does not mention choice-oflaw clauses. To Joseph Beale, the reporter for the First Restatement,
choice-of-law clauses constituted impermissible private legislation.3"
After all, if choice of law is an exercise in the allocation of sovereign
authority, it seemed nonsensical to enable private parties to allocate that
authority. The Second Restatement drafters viewed the matter
differently, probably for several reasons, but one important reason was
to restore a sense of certainty to choice of law for contracts. 3'

28. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 188(1) ("[Tihe rights and duties of the
parties with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local law of the state
which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction
and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.").
29. Id. § 187 cmt. e.
30. Joseph H. Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract:III. Theoreticaland
PracticalCriticisms of the Authorities, 23 HARV. L. REV. 260, 260 (1910).
31. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 187 cint. e ("Prime objectives of contract

law are to protect the justified expectations of the parties and to make it possible for them
to foretell with accuracy what will be their rights and liabilities under the contract. These
objectives may best be attained in multistate transactions by letting the parties choose the
law to govern the validity of the contract and the rights created thereby. In this way,
certainty and predictability of result are most likely to be secured.").
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Section 187(1) allows the parties to choose any law that they wish to
serve as the basis for governing default rules, or rules that the parties
could write directly into their contracts. 2 Section 187(2) also gives the
parties substantial ability to choose the governing law even in cases
where one or more of the states connected to the parties or transaction
would not permit the parties to directly write such a provision into the
contract.3 3 Specifically, section 187(2) provides:
The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual
rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one
which the parties could not have resolved by an explicit provision in
their agreement directed to that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or
the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties'
choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest
than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and
which, under the [general choice-of-law rule for contract], would be the
state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law
by the parties.'
Section 187 has not proven to be a controversial addition to the Second
Restatement. State courts appear to have embraced it just as willingly
as they have embraced the rest of the Second Restatement. In fact,
today, courts across the country use § 187 to govern the enforceability
of choice-of-law clauses, even in states that have not adopted the Second
Restatement for other choice-of-law purposes.35
On its face, § 187(2) appears to have built-in safeguards to prevent
parties from strategically using choice-of-law clauses to circumvent
important state policies. Under subsection (a), the parties are constrained from choosing a state that is wholly unrelated to the contract.35 And under subsection (b), the parties' choice need not be
respected where it would have the effect of violating state policies.37
With closer scrutiny, however, these limitations are narrow exceptions
to the rule, to preserve parties' certainty regarding the governing law.
Consider, for example, the substantial relationship requirement. In

32.
33.
34.

Id. § 187(1).
Id. § 187(2).
Id.

35. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2003: Seventeenth
Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. CoMP. L. 9, 28 (2004).
36. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 187(2)(a).

37. Id. § 187(2)(b).
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addition to the fact that a court can excuse this requirement if it finds
another reasonable basis for the parties' choice,3" corporations and
wealthy parties can establish connections with a desired state where
necessary in order to choose its law. It takes relatively little for a
company to open a sales office, to create a subsidiary entity to handle
the relevant portion of the company's business, or to locate a key mobile
asset in a particular state.
Moreover, although subsection (b) provides a public policy exception
to a state's enforcement obligations, the exception is quite narrow. First,
application of the law of the chosen state must be contrary to a
fundamental policy of the state whose law would otherwise apply.
Second, it is not sufficient that the chosen law would violate public
policy in the forum. Instead, the chosen law must violate the public
policy of the state with the most significant relationship to the parties
and the transaction. Even so, the state with the most significant
relationship must have a materially greater interest in the outcome of
the particular issue than the chosen state. All three hurdles must be
cleared before a court can ignore the parties' choice of governing law.39
IV.

CHOICE CLAUSES AT WORK

A.

Choice-of-Law Clauses
The state of uncertainty for choice of law, about to be made quite a bit
worse with the multi-factored Second Restatement approach, created the
justification for a strong presumption in favor of party choice. In the
years following the publication of the Second Restatement, however,
potent market forces have pressured states to provide even more
significant freedom of choice to contracting parties. In particular,
technological advancements, decreased transportation costs, and lowered
barriers at national borders have all worked to make assets much more
mobile. With this enhanced mobility, states must compete to attract
those assets, and one carrot in the interstate competition is to enable
parties to choose their own governing laws, and, consequently, desired
regulatory environments.4 ° In order to attract private parties, six U.S.
states have passed statutes that open freedom of choice for governing
law beyond the generous provisions of the Second Restatement. In

38. Michael Guajardo, Comment, Texas' Adoption of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws: Public Policy is the Trump Card,But When Can It Be Played?, 22 TEx.
TECH. L. REV. 837, 855 (1991).
39. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 187 cmt. g.
40. See generally ERIN A. OHARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009).
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particular, California, New York, Texas, Delaware, Illinois, and Florida
have all enacted statutes enabling parties to choose their law for highvalue contracts without either a connection requirement or a public
policy exception.4 1
In a world where just about everyone outside of Macon, Georgia,
yawns about choice of law, the Second Restatement provisions, broadly
interpreted, and the even more expansive statutes of the states
considered commercial leaders, are especially effective because they are
very quiet mechanisms for attracting firms and wealthy individuals to
the state. Unlike tax breaks or the repeal of substantive laws designed
to benefit or protect purely local constituents, treatment of choice of law
is unlikely to generate significant legislative pressures for reversal, and
it is even less likely to generate significant media attention.
With pressure for states to accept a party's choice of law come
incentives on the part of some states and nations to create regulatory
environments considered appealing to private parties. Examples of
states providing appealing substantive laws as mechanisms for
attracting others to the state, both within and without contract, can be
found in many contexts. For example, Delaware is reputed to dominate
the competition for corporate law in the United States, and companies
can choose Delaware law simply by incorporating in Delaware.42 New
York strives to provide state-of-the-art commercial law and business
courts, which outsiders can opt for with choice-of-law and forum
clauses.43 Few believe that these choices work to corrode the public
policies of other states. Consider, however, a few potentially more
problematic situations.
In maritime commerce, ship owners are permitted to register and
carry the flag of any nation they choose. Traditionally, the law of the
flag applies to the activities onboard the vessel, to ensure uniform
treatment of the ship and its owners and employees as it passes through

41. CAL. Cwv. CODE § 1646.5 (current through 2012 Legis. Sess.), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/calaw.html; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2708 (current through 2012
Legis. Sess.), available at httpJ/delcode.delaware.gov/title6/c027/sc0l/index.shtml; FLA.
STAT. § 685.101 (current through 2012 Legis. Sess.), available at http://www.leg.state.fl.us
/statutes; 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/5-5 (current through 2012 Legis. Sess.), available
at http'J/www.flga.gov/legislation/ilcs; N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (current through
2012 Legis. Sess.), available at httpJ/public.legalinfo.state.ny.us/Lawseaf; TEX. Bus. &
CoMM. CODE §§ 271.001-011 (current through 2012 Legis. Sess.), available at http://www.

statutes.legis.state.tx.us.
42. Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum and Delaware'sStake
in CorporateLaw, 34 DEL J. CoRP. L. 57, 59-60 (2009).
43. See William J. Woodard, Jr., ContractualChoice of Law: Legislative Choice in an
Era of PartyAutonomy, 54 SMU L. REv. 697, 699 (2011).
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the marine territory of many nations." Despite the efforts of some
governments to ensure that ship operations comply with minimum
acceptable safety and environmental measures, many ships have been
registered in states without such regulatory standards.4 5 Small nations
in particular can benefit significantly from the registration fees, and
they can credibly commit not to impose regulatory requirements on
ships. Thus, nations identified by the International Transport Workers
Federation as unable or unwilling to enforce international minimum
social standards on their vessels include Antigua, the Bahamas, Liberia,
Panama, and the Marshall Islands." Known as flag-of-convenience47
states, these countries each register in excess of 1,000 foreign ships.
Ship owners who register in these nations can place choice-of-law clauses
in their employment contracts in an effort to ensure that their obligations as employers do not extend beyond those required by the lax laws
of the flag-of-convenience states.48
Consider also usury and other consumer credit laws within the United
States. Under the National Bank Act, 49 nationally chartered banks are
permitted to charge an interest rate that is permitted in the state where
the bank is located.5" Over time, this provision has been interpreted
to permit such banks to charge interest permitted at the state of charter
even when much of the bank's activities are located elsewhere. 5'
Moreover, this interest-rate freedom has been interpreted to include late
fees and other charges. 52 In an effort to attract companies from the
financial-service industries to their states, South Dakota, Delaware, and
other states repealed their usury laws and pledged not to regulate late

44. William Telley, The Law of the Flag, "FlagShopping," and Choice of Law, 17 TUL.
MAR. L.J. 139, 146-47 (1993).
45. Id. at 173-74.
46. International Transport Workers' Federation: FOC Countries, rTFGLOBAL.ORG,
http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/flags-convenien-183.cfm (last visited Apr. 7,
2013).
47. The World Factbook, cIA.GOv, https://www'cia.gov/library/pucations/the-worldfactbookiindex.html. For each country, the vast majority of ships on its registry are foreign
ships: ninety-seven percent of the ships registered with Antigua, ninety-two percent of the
ships registered with the Bahamas, ninety-three percent of the ships registered with
Liberia, eighty percent of the ships registered in Panama, and ninety-two percent of the
ships registered in the Marshall Islands are foreign-owned. Id.
48. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 588-89 (1953).
49. 12 U.S.C. § 38 (2006).
50. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2006).
51. Marquette Natl Bank v. First Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 301 (1978).
52. Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 738-40, 747 (1996).
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fees and other charges found in credit agreements.53 As a result, credit
card companies can operate nationwide as branches of national banks
chartered in South Dakota and Delaware, and the other states are not
permitted to regulate the credit agreements, even if the agreements
involve their own state citizens. Given that nationally chartered banks
have such freedom, pressure is put on the states to unfetter the statechartered banks so they can compete effectively in the credit markets.
And, of course, one quiet mechanism for freeing such banks is to permit
them to choose the law that governs their agreements.54 Thus, while
it was once commonplace for states to conclude that banks violated local
public policy for a loan charging a usurious interest rate in the forum
even if legally permitted elsewhere,55 such cases have all but disappeared from the jurisprudential landscape, at least in choice-of-law cases
outside the context of payday loans.
Finally, consider trust law. Some nations, such as the Cook Islands,
the Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Bermuda, and Jersey (Channel Islands),
allow the creation of trusts under which the settlor and the beneficiary
are the same person.56 In doing so, these nations facilitate the use of
a trust vehicle as a mechanism for shielding assets from third-party
creditors. In an attempt to capture some of this multi-billion dollar
activity, several U.S. states, including Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, Rhode
Island, Utah, Missouri, Oklahoma, and South Dakota, have passed laws
enabling the creation of domestic asset-protection trusts. 5 7 Although
several features of U.S. law prevent domestic trust vehicles from
providing the strength of asset protection possible in other nations,
settlors need not worry about untrustworthy foreign trustees or unstable
foreign governments. Competitive pressures may well lead to the

53. John P. Seidenberg et al., States Create Friendly Climate for Card Issuers by
RepealingUsury Laws, CARD NEWS, June 3, 1991, availableat http://www.accessintel.com/.
54. See, e.g., Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. of Ga. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 642
F.2d 744, 753-54 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the Mississippi choice-of-law clause was
effective to avoid Texas's usury law); Christiansen v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 972 F. Supp.
681, 684-85 (S.D. Ga. 1997) (holding that the Delaware choice-of-law clause was enforceable
even though the terms of agreement violated Georgia's criminal usury statute). Similar
efforts could one day frustrate state ability to regulate payday loans. For now, however,
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is taking the position that the National Bank
Act does not govern such agreements. Angela Littwin, Testing the SubstitutionHypothesis:
Would Credit CardRegulations Force Low-Income Borrowers into Less DesirableLending
Alternatives?, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 403, 418 (2009).
55.

15 GRACE MCLANE G1ESEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: CONTRACTS CONTRARY TO

PUBLIC POLICY § 87 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2003) (listing several usury bargains).
56. Frederick J. Tansill, Asset ProtectionTrusts (APTS): Non-Tax Issues, STOIZ ALI-ABA

293, 310, 315-16 (2011).
57. Id. at 327.
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enforcement of choice-of-law clauses for any disputes involving the
domestic asset-protection vehicles, especially in the courts of those states
where the trust is located.
The federal courts face the same pressure to enforce choice-of-law
clauses. Indeed, the federal courts seem particularly cognizant of the
negative trade consequences by refusing to enforce choice-of-law clauses.
For example, every federal circuit that has considered the issue has
determined that the choice-of-law clause in contracts between American
names and Lloyd's of London are enforceable despite the fact that the
clauses would work to defeat the investor's federal-securities law and
federal racketeering claims.58 Even in diversity cases, where state law
principles are to apply to determine the enforceability of choice-of-law
clauses, federal courts as a whole enforce the clauses at higher rates
than do the state courts as a whole.59 The difference in enforcement
rate stems from the flexibility inherent in § 187 of the Second Restatement. Under that test, it is often unclear what will count as a "substantial relationship" or "other reasonable basis for the parties' choice"; it is
similarly unclear what constitutes a "fundamental policy," or whether a
state has a "materially greater interest" under the public-policy
exception. 60 Perhaps because of greater enforcement, federal courts
apparently hear the vast majority of cases where enforcement of the
choice-of-law clause is disputed. 1
B.

Choice-of-Court Clauses

In those relatively rare circumstances where parties cannot ensure
enforcement of choice-of-law clauses in state court or with removal of a
case to federal court, enforcement can typically be secured with the
addition of a forum-selection clause to the contract. If parties wish to
have their agreement enforced according to Delaware law, they can
couple the choice-of-law clause with a choice-of-court clause that provides
that all disputes will be resolved exclusively in Delaware courts.
Presumably judges in Delaware would embrace the application of
Delaware law, but the harder question is whether the choice-of-court

58. See, e.g., Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1294-95 (11th
Cir. 1998); Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1998);
Haynsworth v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 121 F.3d 956, 966 (5th Cir. 1997); Allen v. Lloyd's of
London, 94 F.3d 923, 929-30 (4th Cir. 1996); Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 162
(7th Cir. 1993); Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1366 (2d Cir. 1993); Riley v.
Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 958-59 (10th Cir. 1992).
59. See O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 40, at 83-84; Larry E. Ribstein, FromEfficiency
to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. L. REV. 363, 420 (2003).
60. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 187.
61. See O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 40, at 83-84; Ribstein, supra note 59, at 420.
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clause will be enforced by courts outside of Delaware. For state law
claims in state court, enforcement of a choice-of-court clause is a matter
of state law. 2 Enforcement of choice-of-court clauses is one easy way
to alleviate docket congestion. Moreover, even those courts that would
be reticent to enforce the choice-of-law clause often are willing to enforce
the choice-of-court clause because the choice-of-court clause insulates
them from having to directly address the choice-of-law matter."
For cases removable to federal court, federal law typically governs the
enforcement of a choice-of-court clause.64 For federal law purposes, the
United States Supreme Court has expressed a strong policy in favor of
enforcing such clauses.65 In order to defeat enforcement of the forumselection clause, the party resisting enforcement must "clearly show that
enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause [is]
invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching."6 6 According to the
Court, this presumption in favor of enforceability was justified by
international trade pressures. 7 In particular, the Court has said:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be
encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a
parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws
and in our courts.... We cannot have trade and commerce in world

markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed
by our laws, and resolved in our courts.'
C. Arbitration Clauses
If parties have some reason for concern that their choice-of-law clause
will not be enforced, either alone or in conjunction with a choice-of-court
clause, there remains an arbitration option. Under the Federal

62.
63.
2010);
64.

§ 80.
See, e.g., Rafael Rodriguez Barril v. Conbraco Indus., Inc., 619 F.3d 90, 95 (st Cir.
In re Autonation, Inc., 228 S.W.3d 663, 670 (Tex. 2007).
Federal law unequivocally governs the question for claims brought under federal
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 3,

statute and for motions to transfer venue in the federal courts. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31-32 (1988). And a majority of circuits considering the matter have
concluded that the enforceability of court-selection clauses is procedural for Erie purposes

and therefore governed by federal law. See, e.g., Wong v. PartyGaming Ltd., 589 F.3d 821,
827-28 (6th Cir. 2009) (discussing circuit court caselaw). Two circuits have concluded that
enforceability is to be determined according to state law but that the law designated in the
parties' agreement is to be used to resolve the question. Id. at 827. This conclusion is also
very likely to result in the enforcement of a choice-of-court clause.
65. MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 9.
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Arbitration Act,6" both state and federal courts have an obligation to
enforce arbitration agreements." ° Parties are entitled to an order
referring their dispute to arbitration even when it involves a cause of
Thus, securities law,7 1
action premised on public-law concerns.
antitrust

ing 4

law,72

employment discrimination,73 and federal racketeer-

claims are all subject to arbitration unless the parties indicate
otherwise. Moreover, states cannot create private causes of action that
are immune from resolution in arbitration.7 5 Most arbitration associations require the arbitrators to apply the law designated in the parties'
agreement,7' and the Supreme Court has indicated that, because
arbitration is a creature of contract, the arbitrator is required to comply
with the limitations provided in the agreement.
Thus, coupling an
arbitration clause with a choice-of-law clause can secure enforcement of
the latter.
The Supreme Court has addressed potential problems associated with
parties using arbitration as a mechanism for circumventing public
regulatory laws and has attempted to provide assurances that abuses of
these clauses can be prevented.7" For example, in Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., s the plaintiff argued that it
should not have to proceed to arbitration because the arbitration clause
worked to effect an end-run around U.S. antitrust law. 0 Specifically,
the contract called for arbitration in Japan and contained a choice-of-law
clause that provided: 'This Agreement is made in, and will be governed
by and construed in all respects according to the laws of the Swiss
Confederation as if entirely performed therein."8 1 The U.S. government
submitted an amicus brief in the case expressing concern that the

69.

9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).

70. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
71. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 482-83 (1989)
(applying the Securities Act of 1933); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 238 (1987) (applying the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
72. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,624,627-28
(1985).
73. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1991).
74. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242.
75. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 9-10; Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1987).
76. See O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 40, at 87-88 (discussing phenomenon).
77. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 476-79 (1989); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklie Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406-07
(1967).
78. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628-37.
79. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
80. Id. at 624-25.
81. Id. at 652 n.19.
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arbitrators would read this provision as wholly displacing U.S. law
where it would otherwise apply.2 The International Chamber of
Commerce (the body that would host this arbitration) also submitted an
amicus brief admitting it was "[clonceivabl[e], although we believe it
unlikely, [that] the arbitrators could consider Soler's affirmative claim
of anticompetitive conduct by CISA and Mitsubishi to fall within the
purview of this choice-of-law provision, with the result that it would be
decided under Swiss law rather than the U.S. Sherman Act." 3 The
Court was able to avoid dealing with the matter directly because the
defendant had effectively conceded to the application of U.S. antitrust
law by representing that the claims had been submitted to arbitration
on that basis.' To address the concern in future cases, however, the
Court stated in a footnote:
We therefore have no occasion to speculate on this matter at this stage
in the proceedings, when Mitsubishi seeks to enforce the agreement to
arbitrate, not to enforce an award. Nor need we consider now the effect
of an arbitral tribunal's failure to take cognizance of the statutory
cause of action on the claimant's capacity to reinitiate suit in federal
court. We merely note that in the event the choice-of-forum and choiceof-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's
right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would
have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public
policy."
Although this statement suggests a willingness to refuse enforcement
of arbitration agreements in future cases, the Court has expressed a
repeated reluctance to police potentially problematic arbitral behavior
at the agreement enforcement stage. For example, when the same
argument was raised in a later case involving the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act, 8 the Supreme Court dismissed the concern as premature. s7
The Court reasoned that choice-of-law questions must be decided in the
first instance by the arbitrator, and that concerns about the effective
enforcement of U.S. law can be treated at the award-enforcement
stage. 8

82. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (No. 83-1569), 1985 WL
669814, at *20.
83. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 637 n.19 (alterations in original).
84. Id.

85. Id.
86. 46 U.S.C. § 30701 (2006).
87. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540-41 (1995).

88. Id. at 541.
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In reality, however, circumvention of federal or state law typically
cannot be effectively addressed at the award-enforcement stage. In
international commercial arbitration, it is generally understood that the
awards are to be vacated only at the seat of arbitration, 89 so parties can
avoid U.S. court vacatur by seating the arbitration outside of the United
States, which occurred in both of the Supreme Court cases discussed
above.9 ° And even if a U.S. court was willing to vacate an arbitral
award rendered elsewhere, other nations remain free to enforce the
award.9 1 U.S. courts could refuse to enforce an award if the prevailing
party came to the United States for enforcement, but that is unlikely to
occur for at least two reasons. First, in cases where avoiding U.S. law
leads to no liability for a party, there is no subsequent enforcement
action. Second, the awards can be enforced wherever the losing party
has assets, so in many cases avoiding the U.S. courts is entirely feasible.
For both international and domestic arbitrations, the parties are
entitled to choose their arbitrators, and the chosen arbitrators typically
need not be lawyers.9 2 Additionally, unless the parties or the arbitration association require otherwise, arbitrators need not issue reasoned
opinions with their awards.93 Thus, it can be practically impossible for
a court to determine whether an arbitrator actually refused to apply U.S.
law. In apparent recognition of the very real possibility that U.S.
antitrust laws would not be applied, the Court in Mitsubishi quoted the

89. This understanding comes from the fact that the only mention of set aside or
suspension of an arbitration award makes reference only to the courts of the country in
which, or under the law ofwhich, the award was rendered. United Nations Conference on
International Commercial Arbitration, New York, June 10, 1958, Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. V(1)(e), 330 U.N.T.S. 3,
available at httpi//treaties.un.org.
90. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 627-28; Vimar Sequros y Reasequros,515

U.S. at 540-41.
91. In fact, refusals to enforce arbitral awards are apparently quite rare. One study
found that only ten percent of the reported cases involving the New York Convention
resulted in court refusal to enforce a foreign arbitral award. Albert Jan van den Berg, New
York Convention of 1958: Refusals of Enforcement, ICC ICARB. BULL. 75 (Supp. 1999). Of
course, this ten percent figure drastically overstates the frequency of enforcement refusal,
because the vast majority of awards are voluntarily complied with, and in the few cases
where the enforcement question is raised in a court, judgments leading to enforcement are
less likely to include a written opinion, and the opinions are less likely to be published.
CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHozAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND PROBLEMS 563 (2d ed.
2006).
92. Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
93. Michael P. O'Mullan, Note, Seeking Consistency in Judicial Review of Securities
Arbitration:An Analysis of the Manifest Disregardof the Law Standard, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1121, 1135 (1995).
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same language from MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 9 when it
stated:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be
encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a
parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws
and in our courts.... We cannot have trade and commerce in world
markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed
by our laws, and resolved in our courts. 95
V. THE DEMISE OF THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Taken together, the enforcement of these choice clauses has resulted
in the demise of the private attorney general. Private causes of action
designed to help further the states' interest in compliance with federal
regulations need no longer be heard in forums where laws will provide
relief for their violations. Franchise regulations, discrimination claims,
securities laws, antitrust laws, fraud claims, fiduciary duty claims, and
others suffer in a world where choice-of-law clauses enable drafting
parties to opt for the laws they prefer.
The problem for states attempting to protect their own interests is
particularly acute in the context of adhesion contracts, where the party
losing legal rights may not have made a knowing choice to abdicate
them. State and federal private causes of action designed to protect
consumers and employees can be defeated with choice-of-law clauses,
especially where the contract also contains an arbitration clause. In
general, arbitration clauses are enforceable in both consumer96 and
employee 97 contracts, and the United States Supreme Court has
disenabled courts from categorically refusing to enforce class waivers in
the arbitration agreements.9" Thus, in addition to enabling a company
to choose more favorable law, an arbitration clause can work to defeat
the class mechanism, which is considered essential to the effective
vindication of small-value claims.99

94. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
95. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 629 (quoting MIS Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
96. See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012);
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745-46 (2011); Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272-73 (1995).
97. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1991).
98. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744-45, 1753.
99. Companies could sometimes avoid class proceedings with a choice-of-court clause
designating that disputes would be heard in Virginia state courts, which do not have a
class mechanism. See, e.g., Forrest v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1013 (D.C.
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No doubt the demise of the private attorney general has had as much
to do with choice-of-court and arbitration clauses as it has had to do with
choice-of-law clauses. Nevertheless, the role of choice-of-law clauses
remains significant. If parties are free to choose their forum but not
their governing law, then it is more likely that the substantive policies
embodied in a state law will be respected wherever the dispute is
resolved. Instead, the choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses work
together as a kind of one-two punch that gives parties unprecedented
freedom to avoid undesired laws.
The demise of the private attorney general has forced the states to
play a more active role in the protection of their citizens. The state itself
remains free to bring its own enforcement actions under state and (to
some extent) federal laws, and the state is not subject to the choice
clauses found in the private contracts. 100 Thus, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission can bring federal enforcement actions when
employers impermissibly discriminate against employees, 1 1 and the
Department of Justice can bring enforcement actions under the federal
antitrust and securities claims. 0 2 State attorneys general can bring
parens patriae actions under some federal consumer statutes. 0 3 In
addition, state attorneys general0 4 as well as state agencies are often
empowered to enforce violations of state laws through specific statutory
grants or under the state's general authority to protect the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens.0 5 In fact, at times the Court
attempts to console parties claiming that choice clauses will work to

2002). For contracts with international connections, choosing a court outside the United
States can often also work to defeat the possibility of class proceedings, but these choice-ofcourt clauses were not inevitably enforced in state courts. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v.
Superior Court of Alameda Cnty., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Dix v. ICT
Group, Inc., 161 P.3d 1016, 1024-25 (Wash. 2007).
100. See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32.
101. See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 285-86 (2002).
102. See U.S. v. John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. 102, 105 (1987) (allowing antitrust claims);
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007) (allowing securities

claims).
103. Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of FederalLaw, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698,
708-11 (2011) (discussing federal laws that can be enforced through state government
actions); Amy Widman & Prentiss Cox, State Attorneys General's Use of ConcurrentPublic
Enforcement Authority in Federal Consumer ProtectionLaws, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 53
(2011) (citing twenty-four federal laws that explicitly enable states to act as public
enforcement authorities).
104. See generally Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General
Actions, The Tobacco Litigation,and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859

(2000).
105. Id. at 1869-71.
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defeat state laws by pointing out that this state enforcement mechanism
remains available.'t 6
Of course, state enforcement actions can prove prohibitively expensive
for many states, especially in the current climate of severe budget crises.
A few states have managed to work around budgetary limitations by
hiring private counsel to prosecute parenspatriae actions on behalf of
the state. 0 7 But regardless of the possibility of a work-around by the
state, which is limited, private and state incentives to sue will inevitably
differ. Some state actors will be constrained by partisan politics, or a
fear that criticism of private fee arrangements by lobbying interests
could jeopardize their reelection prospects, or both.'0 8 In some states,
those opposing lobbying interests have successfully imposed bans on the
hiring of outside counsel to represent the state under contingency fee
arrangements.' 9
In addition, the state attorneys general can face
political and other constraints that prevent them from acting in concert,
which may be necessary to effectively address a problem."0 A state
might have put in place the private attorney general vehicle to ensure
that state laws and policies are effectively enforced, even in those cases
where the state government could overcome the limited budgets, limited
information, and/or potentially competing agendas of the state executive
or attorney general offices. Without that mechanism, state policies
necessarily suffer, at least somewhat.
I do not mean to take a position here on the desirability of class
actions, treble damages remedies, and other mechanisms that have been
used to empower private attorneys general to pursue the enforcement of
state policies. Nor do I mean to take a position on whether the state's
incentives are better or worse than those provided to private parties.
Often, I am not even sympathetic to the state policy that is compromised. My goal here is much more modest and is confined to pointing
out an irony.
Brainerd Currie proposed a replacement of the First Restatement, and
in doing so, he powerfully argued that the goal of choice of law should
be to facilitate state policies."' However, the chaos unleashed once
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states attempted to put in place more policy-oriented choice-of-law
principles necessitated a broad recognition of choice-of-law clauses for
Enforcement of these provisions, when coupled with
contracts.
enforcement of forum-choice provisions and very strong interstate and
international trade pressures, has led to a significant compromise on the
ability of states to effectuate their interests. In fact, I have argued
elsewhere that the failure of the states to coordinate their modern
choice-of-law policies has undermined the ability of states to promote
their policies in other ways, because choice-of-law chaos provides an
excuse to take lawmaking authority out of the hands of the state via the
Dormant Commerce Clause and preemption doctrine. 12 In the end,
the movement sparked by Brainerd Currie has worked to defeat states'
abilities to promote their policies-the very last thing Currie would have
wanted.
This Essay takes as a given that Currie's primary goal was to cause
states to put in place a new choice-of-law approach that would work to
promote the ability of states to effectuate their public policies. Jurisprudential realities and changing times have worked together to defeat the
attainment of Currie's goal, even though his proposed approach to choice
of law is so widely used in U.S. courts today. If Currie could join us now
in reflection, would he denounce or modify his proposed approach to
choice of law to more effectively promote state policies? Or would his
faith in his proposed approach, as perhaps evidenced in its widespread
use, prove stronger than the goal he articulated for its adoption? And
if a different or modified approach to choice of law might be proposed,
what would it look like? The first two questions can no longer be
confidently answered, and the answer to this last question must await
another day. Regardless of whether Currie's legacy might one day take
an entirely different form in the conflict of laws, his influence over the
field in the last fifty years has been remarkable. If a new proposal
surfaces to more effectively use choice of law to promote state policies,
it would not be surprising to learn that such proposal has its roots in
Mercer University School of Law.
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